Monográfico: «Retos de la transición energética: derechos humanos y conducta empresarial responsable»

Is the Glass Half Full? Climate Litigation (Hidden) Lessons from the Milieudefensie v. Shell Appeal Case ¿El vaso está medio lleno? Litigios climáticos: lecciones (ocultas) del caso Milieudefensie contra Shell

DOI: https://doi.org/10.69592/3020-1004-N6-FEBRERO-2026-ART9

Francesca Mussi

University of Trento
francesca.mussi@unitn.it

Recibido el 1 de diciembre de 2025; aceptado el 11 de febrero de 2026.

Abstract: On 12 November 2024, The Hague Court of Appeal in Shell v. Milieudefensie overturned the preceding 2021 judgment which obliged Shell to reduce its CO2 emissions resulting from its global operations by 45 %, relative to 2019 levels, by 2030. Indeed, the Court found that Shell’s violation of legal obligations had not been sufficiently demonstrated in relation to its Scope 1 and 2 emissions and refused to affirm a concrete reduction target by 2030 of Shell’s Scope 3 emissions. While the verdict cannot be celebrated as a success from a climate justice’s perspective, the legal reasoning of the Court of Appeal provides some foundational – even if less visible – takeaways concerning the doctrine of indirect horizontal effect of human rights, the relevance attributed to EU climate legislation and the consequences of projected investments in new oil and gas fields. The present contribution focuses on these aspects, with a view to highlighting the major implications and the positive impact they may have in providing strategic guidance for future climate litigation action.

Keywords: Climate litigation; multinational companies; Milieudefensie v. Shell; indirect horizontal effect of human rights; EU climate legislation; investments in new oil and gas fields

Resumen: El 12 de noviembre de 2024, el Tribunal de Apelación de La Haya, en el caso Shell contra Milieudefensie, revocó la sentencia anterior de 2021 que obligaba a Shell a reducir sus emisiones de CO2 derivadas de sus operaciones globales en un 45 %, con respecto a los niveles de 2019, para 2030. De hecho, el Tribunal consideró que no se había demostrado suficientemente el incumplimiento de las obligaciones legales por parte de Shell en relación con sus emisiones de alcance 1 y 2, y se negó a confirmar un objetivo concreto de reducción para 2030 de las emisiones de alcance 3 de Shell. Aunque el veredicto no puede considerarse un éxito desde el punto de vista de la justicia climática, el razonamiento jurídico del Tribunal de Apelación ofrece algunas conclusiones fundamentales, aunque menos visibles, sobre la doctrina del efecto horizontal indirecto de los derechos humanos, la relevancia atribuida a la legislación climática de la UE y las consecuencias de las inversiones previstas en nuevos yacimientos de petróleo y gas. La presente contribución se centra en estos aspectos, con el fin de destacar las principales implicaciones y el impacto positivo que pueden tener a la hora de proporcionar orientación estratégica para futuras acciones judiciales relacionadas con el clima.

Palabras clave: Litigios climáticos; empresas multinacionales; Milieudefensie contra Shell; efecto horizontal indirecto de los derechos humanos; legislación climática de la UE; inversiones en nuevos yacimientos de petróleo y gas.

I. Introduction

Climate litigation continues to show a steady expansion, both in the number of cases filed and the number of jurisdictions within which they have been brought, according to the Report “Climate Change in the courtroom: Trends, impacts, and emerging lessons” published last October by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia University.1 Indeed, according to the Report, as of 30 June 2025, a cumulative 3,099 climate-related cases have been filed in 55 national jurisdictions and 24 international or regional courts, tribunals, or quasi-judicial bodies.2 This continues a trend in climate-related cases filed by 2022 (2,180 cases), 2020 (1,550 cases) and 2017 (884 cases).3 Since the first recorded climate litigation case nearly four decades ago,4 the field has enlarged both in volume and in geographical scope,5 while the range of legal theories and actors involved has also expanded. This growth reflects the increasing use of international and domestic courts as venues for addressing the multifaceted legal dimensions of climate change.6

At the international level, since the global and transboundary effects of climate change become more pronounced, the number of decisions by (and cases currently pending before)7 international adjudicative bodies continue to grow. In this regard, suffice it to recall the advisory opinions on climate change rendered in the last years by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS),8 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)9 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ)10 respectively, or the judgments recently handed down by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in the climate cases VereinKlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland,11 Carême v. France,12 Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Other States,13 and Greenpeace Nordic and Others v. Norway,14 or, again, the decision rendered by the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Ligue Ivoirienne des Droits de l’Homme and Others v. Côte d’Ivoire.15

As regards domestic climate litigation,16 the vast majority of cases have been filed across jurisdictions against States. These cases typically concern the (in)adequacy of domestic climate policies or statutory frameworks in light of international climate law standards and obligations17 or rely on innovative interpretations of international human rights law to contest slow and inadequate efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.18 Moreover, as governments continue to approve fossil fuel infrastructure despite global climate goals, another prominent category of cases address the compatibility of specific resource-extraction and resource-dependent projects with climate commitments under the Paris Agreement.19 In recent years, a growing number of cases have been brought also against corporations, especially with regard to questionable companies’ adaptation measures in response to the escalating impacts of climate change20 or in an attempt to obtain compensation or reparations for the adverse impacts of climate change that cannot be avoided through mitigation or adaptation21 or, again, to clarify companies’ duty to mitigate GHG emissions.22

Among the cases targeting corporations, particularly relevant is the class action lawsuit launched in 2019 by the environmental group Milieudefensie/Friends of the Earth Netherlands against Royal Dutch Shell Plc,23 seeking a ruling from The Hague District Court that Shell must reduce its CO2 emissions by 45 % by 2030 compared to 2010 levels and to zero by 2050, in line with the Paris Agreement. In 2021, the District Court issued a landmark decision concluding that Shell had to cut down its emissions by 45 % by 2030, relative to 2019, across all activities including both its own emissions and end-use emissions. The Court rooted its ruling in the “unwritten standard of care”24 laid down in the Dutch Civil Code as interpreted in light of international human rights law (in particular, the right to life and the right to respect for private and family life as enshrined in Arts. 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights) (ECHR); the major soft-law instruments of corporate social responsibility; and climate science reports.25

Unsurprisingly, in July 2022 Shell appealed the decision, and on 12 November 2024 the Court of Appeal in The Hague issued its very much anticipated judgment.26 It followed the First Instance Court by deciding that Shell carries a legal duty of care to tackle dangerous climate change, flowing from Dutch tort law, read in light of international human rights law instruments, as well as EU and international climate law. However, the Court of Appeal overturned the earlier judgment by concluding that Shell’s “impending violation of a legal obligation” to reduce its emissions had not been sufficiently demonstrated in relation to, so-called, Scope 1 (direct emissions from facilities owned or controlled by the company) and 2 (indirect emissions associated with the company’s purchase of energy for its business activities, which also constitute direct emissions of the corporate group) emissions. In addition, it refused to specify a concrete emission reduction target for Shell’s Scope 3 emissions (all other indirect emissions arising in a company’s value chain, including those produced by end consumers), as there is insufficient scientific consensus about a precise reduction percentage or pathway that an individual company such as Shell should adhere to. Therefore, according to the Court of Appeal, it is not possible to impose on Shell a specific legal obligation to cut its emissions by 45 % by 2030 as compared to 2019. While the verdict was hailed as a legal victory by Shell,27 it cannot be celebrated as a success from a climate justice’s perspective. This notwithstanding, the legal reasoning of the Court of Appeal provides some important – if less visible – lessons which, at least to a certain extent, may significantly serve future climate litigation.

Pending the determination of an appeal lodged by Milieudefensie before the Supreme Court of The Netherlands,28 the present contribution aims at providing an analysis of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in The Hague by highlighting some of its major takeaways upon which future climate litigation may build. To this purpose, attention will focus on the implications of the doctrine of indirect horizontal effect of human rights, the relevance attributed to EU climate legislation and the considerations developed by the Court about the consequences of projected investments in new oil and gas fields.

II. The judgment of The Court of Appeal in The Hague

Following the District Court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed in clear terms that Dutch citizens “have the right to protection against dangerous climate change, also from Shell”.29 Moreover, it stated that while human rights obligations are primarily directed at States, they can have an impact on private law relationships by giving substance to open standards, such as the societal standard of care stemming from Art. 6:612 of the Dutch Civil Code.30 According to the Court, since climate change harms the rights protected by Arts. 2 and 8 of the ECHR, the said provisions are crucial for the interpretation of Shell’s duty of care.31 In addition, similar to the District Court, it confirmed that the duty in question can be interpreted in light of a variety of relevant international and regional human rights standards, as well as broadly accepted “scientific consensus” around climate change. Amongst relevant materials taken into account by the Court of Appeal are judgments of international courts (such as the above-mentioned ruling of the ECtHR in the VereinKlimaSeniorinnen case), as well as key international soft law documents, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP)32 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct (OECD Guidelines),33 and the relevant EU legislation.34 The Court also emphasised that the content and scope of the duty of care may vary from one company to another, as what is needed depends on a company’s contribution to climate change and its capacity to counter it.35 In its view, more can be expected of Shell than of most other companies, as Shell has been a major player in the fossil fuel market for over 100 years and continues to occupy a prominent position in that market today.36 Therefore, the Court of Appeal concluded that “companies like Shell, which contribute significantly to the climate problem and have it within their power to contribute to combating it, have an obligation to limit CO2 emissions to counter dangerous climate change, even if this obligation is not explicitly laid down in (public law) regulations of the countries in which the company operates”.37

While confirming the key legal principles upheld by the District Court, the Court of Appeal differed, however, with the latter on some points, particularly on the recognition of a concrete emission reduction target for Shell. Preliminarily, in line with the “Greenhouse Gas Protocol” (the most widely used international standard for measuring and reporting GHG emissions), it split its analysis of the alleged obligation for the company distinguishing between the Scope 1 and 2 emissions, and the Scope 3 emissions of Shell.38

Regarding Scope 1 and 2 emissions, which were treated jointly, Shell successfully convinced the Court that the company is not violating any legal duty under the prevailing law to limit its emissions. In fact, the Court noted that Shell seems to be on its way to achieving its own current (rather ambitious) reduction target of 45 % by 2035 compared to 201639 and saw no imminent risk that Shell would not comply with the alleged reduction obligation.40 It further argued that the plaintiffs’ arguments, including the fact that Shell had watered down targets in the past, were not sufficient to suggest that Shell would backtrack on its current targets.41

As regards Shell’s obligation in relation to its Scope 3 emissions, constituting around 95 % of the group’s releases, the Court engaged in a more comprehensive examination.42 Importantly, it clearly affirmed that Shell’s general reduction obligation, arising from the societal standard of care, extends also to its Scope 3 emissions,43 thus rejecting the company’s argument that Shell lacks the capacity to influence the emissions generated by end-users. On the contrary, the Court maintained that it is “too easy to assert that Shell has no influence over Scope 3 emissions,” acknowledging, however, that Shell’s ability to affect such emissions may be limited.44 In addition, the Court emphasised that recognising such responsibility does not entail holding Shell liable for the lawful acts of third parties.45 Rather, it imposes a duty of care upon the company, rendering it accountable solely for its own conduct.

Nevertheless, the central issue remained whether a specific minimum reduction obligation could be identified in respect of Scope 3 emissions. The Court underscored the broad consensus supporting a net 45 % emission reduction by 2030 relative to 2019 levels, and a 100 % reduction by 2050. However, it observed that this trajectory reflects a general global reduction pathway, and that distinct standards may apply to particular sectors, jurisdictions, or categories of enterprises.46 In this regard, the Court concluded that the net 45 % reduction target was “not sufficiently case-specific” to be directly applied to Shell.47

While acknowledging Shell’s particular responsibility as a major actor in the oil and gas sector, the Court held that even the “equity” argument advanced by Milieudefensie – that is, the fair distribution of the emission reduction burden among relevant actors – was too general to substantiate the imposition of a specific 45 % reduction obligation on Shell.48 Nor, in the Court’s view, could a sector-specific benchmark be derived for this purpose, given the significant divergence among existing sources concerning the appropriate reduction rate for the oil and gas industry.49 The Court of Appeal further observed that even the reduction percentage calculated by the International Energy Agency (IEA) is “subject to change” and was never intended to serve as the foundation for a legally binding standard applicable to an individual company.50 Finally, the invocation of the precautionary principle did not alter this conclusion, as the Court reasoned that the case did not involve scientific uncertainty regarding the harmful consequences of GHG emissions – which are well established – but rather uncertainty as to the applicable normative standard.51

Furthermore, the Court expressed doubts regarding the effectiveness of imposing specific Scope 3 emissions reduction targets on individual companies. While concurring with the District Court’s decision that a global reduction in Scope 3 emissions is a generally desirable objective, it questioned the assumption that mandating such reductions at the level of a single corporation would meaningfully contribute to that goal.52 In its reasoning, Shell could theoretically comply with such an obligation by curtailing its sales of fossil fuels; however, its withdrawal from the value chain would not prevent already-produced fossil fuels from ultimately reaching consumers “through another intermediary.”53 Thus, although the Court acknowledged that limiting fossil fuel production could, in principle, lead to lower emissions, it concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a causal nexus between sales restrictions and actual emissions reductions.54

III. A few (hidden) takeaways from the judgment of The Court of Appeal in The Hague

The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal in The Hague undoubtedly tempers the most ambitious expectations of climate litigation. Indeed, the Court refused to uphold a specific emission reduction obligation on a multinational corporation such as Shell. However, it has clearly affirmed important principles concerning businesses’ responsibility in the context of climate change, such as their duty to reduce their Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions – emanating from a societal standard of care, interpreted in light of international human rights law and existing international frameworks on corporate human rights and environmental responsibility – or the recognition of the fact that the precise scope of each actor’s obligations depends on various factors, including the sector in which the company operates, its contribution to climate change, and its capacity to participate in mitigation efforts. In addition, reading between the lines of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, one can find some additional hidden yet foundational lessons which may have significant positive impacts on future climate litigation.

3.1. The societal standard of care and the indirect horizontal effects of human rights on corporations

One of the most important implications of the appellate decision – and a reason why the judgment is still celebrated as a success in Dutch civil society –55 lies in the fact that, in affirming in unequivocal terms that Dutch citizens “have the right to protection against dangerous climate change, also from Shell”, the Court of Appeal makes recourse to the doctrine of indirect horizontal effect of human rights to interpret the concept of the duty of care. Indeed, in the Dutch legal system, fundamental rights – such as, for the purpose of the case in question, the rights protected by Arts. 2 and 8 of the ECHR – have generally a vertical effect, as they apply in the citizen-government relationship.56 Therefore, their influence is typically indirect: they shape the interpretation of open norms of conduct rather than creating direct, self-standing obligations for private parties. However, when the values expressed by fundamental rights are of such great importance to society as a whole, they can also be invoked “by citizens in their relationship with a private company”,57 as is Shell. Based on the recalled doctrine, “the court may [hence] include fundamental rights – or the values embodied in them – in its considerations when applying general private law concepts such as conflict with what is proper social conduct” according to the social standard of care under the Dutch Civil Code.58 In so doing, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning confirms that corporations do not operate in a human-rights-free zone. Their conduct remains subject to legal evaluation informed by internationally recognized rights, even if courts exercise restraint in prescribing specific outcomes.

Quite interestingly, the Court clarifies the rationale behind the horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the context of climate change. In this regard, it preliminarily recalls the different factors which are relevant to determine, in applying those rights and values, whether the social standard of care has been breached, namely the severity of the threat of a particular danger (i.e., climate change), the contribution to the creation of the danger and the capacity to contribute to counter the danger.59As regards the first element, in the Court’s view, there is no doubt that the climate problem is the greatest issue of our time,60 as it poses a threat to human and animal existence, affecting the rights protected by Arts. 2 and 8 of the ECHR. With reference to the contribution to the creation of the danger, the Court notes that fossil fuel consumption is largely responsible for creating the climate problem,61 and acknowledges the pivotal role of companies like Shell in the global fossil fuel metabolism.62 Finally, as far as the capacity to contribute to counter the danger, it highlights that companies like Shell have the power to combat the threat posed by climate change through the development of a business strategy able to reduce and eliminate the harmful emissions attributable to their activity. Consequently, as anticipated in the previous section, the Court comes to the conclusion that everyone has a responsibility to combat the danger posed by climate change,63 not exclusively States, but also companies whose products have contributed to the creation of the climate problem and are in a position to contribute to counter it are obliged to do so vis-à-vis other inhabitants of the earth, even when (public law) rules do not necessarily compel them to do so.64

The acknowledgement of shared responsibility of States and private actors such as corporations to protect human rights from the adverse impacts of climate change and the Court’s recourse to the doctrine of indirect horizontal effect of human rights are undoubtedly laudable legal developments.65 Indeed, although the said doctrine has been explored in cases involving breaches of human rights by transnational corporations,66 its application to disputes between private parties concerning protection against climate change–related risks has yet to be uniformly established or widely accepted. Seen through the prism of indirect horizontal effect, the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case Milieudefensie v. Shell illustrates a broader shift in climate litigation. Courts may be less willing to act as substitute regulators, but they remain open to integrate fundamental rights to interpret an unwritten tort law standard, thus reinforcing a jurisprudential bridge between human rights obligations and corporate duties under private law. Crucially, this mode of application does not convert human rights into directly enforceable obligations against corporations, but it does permit courts to use human rights values as substantive interpretive tools for private law duties. This creates a form of structural pressure on companies: while they may escape immediate injunctive relief, they are placed on notice that failure to align with human rights-compatible climate pathways can carry legal risk. This pressure operates cumulatively. Human rights inform tort law, regulatory expectations, due diligence legislation, and corporate governance norms. Even without a court-mandated reduction order, companies face an increasingly dense web of obligations shaped by the same underlying rights discourse.

It is however important to bear in mind that any assessment of the broader implications of the judgment in question must be attentive to the institutional and doctrinal specificities of the Dutch legal system. The conclusion that human rights retain significant indirect influence on corporate climate responsibility is not the product of a universally applicable legal logic, but rather of an unusually open-ended conception of tort law, which cannot be automatically transposed to other jurisdictions without careful contextualization. As said, Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code defines an unlawful act not only as a violation of a statutory duty or a subjective right, but also as conduct contrary to what is deemed proper according to “unwritten law.” This category has long served as a doctrinal gateway through which courts integrate external normative sources, including human rights treaties, soft law instruments, and evolving standards of care. The judgment in question is a paradigmatic example of this mechanism at work.

In addition, the Dutch courts’ willingness to rely on human rights norms in private litigation is facilitated by a strong tradition of indirect horizontal effect, which does not require a rigid doctrinal distinction between public and private law. This contrasts sharply with jurisdictions in which the horizontal effect of human rights is more contested, more narrowly construed, or doctrinally fragmented. In legal systems that adhere to a stricter separation between human rights law and private law the interpretative space available to courts may be significantly narrower. In such contexts, they may be reluctant to draw on human rights as normative benchmarks for corporate conduct absent explicit legislative guidance.

These differences suggest that appellate judgment in the case Milieudefensie v. Shell should be understood as a context-specific illustration of how human rights can indirectly influence corporate obligations rather than as a blueprint. For litigants in other jurisdictions, the judgment at hand provides a doctrinal template for overcoming traditional barriers to climate litigation against corporations on fundamental rights grounds and demonstrates what is possible where private law is permeable to human rights reasoning, without however guaranteeing similar outcomes where doctrinal gateways are narrower or judicial self-restraint is more pronounced.

3.2. The decisive relevance of EU climate legislation

A second relevant implication of the appellate decision concerns the importance attached to EU law. Indeed, as anticipated in the previous paragraph, according to the Court of Appeal, an “objective factor” to clarify the scope of the social duty of care under the Dutch law is also EU climate legislation,67 as resulting, in particular, from four EU Directives and the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (EUCBAM) Regulation,68 plus a set of other EU measures part of the EU Fit for 55 package.69 According to the appellate proceedings, the respect of this group of EU measures already produces for Shell a significant reduction of CO2 emissions for Scope 1, 2 and 3.70

Among the different EU Directives mentioned in the judgment, particularly relevant is the reference to the recently adopted EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive71 and the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive.72 As recalled in the ruling, the former requires certain large businesses to report sustainability information on an annual basis that their business model and strategy are compatible with the limiting of global warming to 1,5 °C in line with the Paris Agreement and the objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 as established in Regulation (EU) 2021/1119;73 the latter, similarly, under its Articles 1 and 22, sets out an obligation of means for large companies to adopt and put into effect, through best efforts, a transition plan for climate change mitigation aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement as well as intermediate targets under the already mentioned Regulation (EU) 2021/1119.

The analysis of the EU Directives introduced since the District Court’s decision in 2021 and the assessment of their relevance to an ongoing social standard of care owed by Shell is related to the company’s argument that “an obligation on individual companies to reduce their CO2 emissions is not in keeping with the system of the law. According to Shell, decisions on reducing CO2 emissions belong to the domain of the legislator and not the domain of the civil court”.74 The Court of Appeal disagreed with this proposition, finding that the measures of legislators to reduce CO2 emissions are not exhaustive, and that neither the EU nor the Dutch legislator “has stipulated that companies that comply with existing schemes to combat climate change no longer have obligations to further reduce their CO2 emissions”.75 Indeed, according to the Court, the ratio of the considered EU legislation is that companies have their own duty to reduce emissions too.76 As a consequence, obligations arising from existing regulations do not preclude a duty of care based on the social standard of care on the part of individual companies to reduce their CO2 emissions.

In so doing, almost incidentally, the Court of Appeal refers to what, from a legal point of view, seems to be perhaps the most important ground for companies’ obligations and responsibilities: the obligations under EU climate law. Despite the ongoing disputable attempts to significantly water down corporate sustainability reporting and weaken due diligence requirements,77 this is the legal framework that, in the coming years, will determine what companies are legally required to do to cut their GHG emissions.78 The value of such a conclusion is not altered in any manner whatsoever by the fact that the Court did note that the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive does not impose on Shell a reduction obligation of 45 %.79

In addition, by integrating EU climate and due diligence obligations into interpretations of corporate duty of care, the Court of Appeal suggests that national courts are willing to draw on EU regulatory standards to define what expected corporate conduct consists of relative to climate change, on the one side, and that the CSDDD’s growing legal force – and potential civil liability provisions – will increasingly feed into litigation strategy, particularly in cases seeking to hold companies accountable for failing to implement adequate transition plans or due diligence systems, on the other side.

3.3. The consequences of new investments in oil and gas

A third significant consequence of the appellate decision stems from the Court of Appeal’s analysis of projected investments in new oil and gas fields. It highlighted that a quarter of Shell’s production by 2030 is anticipated to derive from fields that were not yet in production in 2021.80 Over 50 % of its investments until 2023 are expected to go to new fields. The plaintiffs’ argument according to which Shell’s investments in new oil and gas fields are contrary to the achievement of climate objectives under the Paris Agreement and could delay the transition to cleaner energy systems was dismissed by the Court as not being covered by the subject matter of the lawsuit,81 but it analysed the issue in some detail, obiter dicta, nevertheless. Indeed, such an assumption appears consistent both with corporate due diligence obligations, and with the warnings of scientific research institutes that there is no room for new fields in any credible 1.5C-aligned scenario.82 In this regard, the Court of Appeal recalled the IPCC in noting that:

existing planned and approved fossil fuel infrastructure will exhaust the remaining carbon budget. Therefore, there is no room for new investment in fossil fuel supply and a need to decommission existing assets. Additionally, the [International Energy Agency] states that new fossil fuel supply is incompatible with the required emissions trajectory to achieve net zero, and that includes new supplies of natural gas and [liquified natural gas] exports, which must peak and decline by the end of this decade.83

Milieudefensie seems to successfully convince the Court of Appeal that new investments will create a dangerous “carbon lock-in” effect: exploring, extracting, producing, transporting and distributing fossil fuels require very important initial investments, which have a long payback period, incentivizing to keep using this infrastructure and thus fossil energy for as long as possible. After the infrastructure is established, the fossil fuels can be produced relatively cheaply. Shell recognizes this carbon lock-in effect as well.

As a result, the Court found that Shell’s proposed investments in new fossil fuel production, including liquified natural gas facilities, could have the effect of seriously delaying the energy transition.84 To keep the objectives of the Paris Agreement within reach, CO2 emissions need to be drastically reduced. To achieve this goal, rapid phase-out of fossil fuels is required. According to the Court, capital allocation decisions – including investments in new fossil fuel exploration and production – are placed within the scope of the duty of care.85 This is a key statement because the Court essentially suggests that the legal debate is moving away from past emissions alone and toward ex ante risk creation. New investments in oil and gas are particularly vulnerable under this logic: they extend the company’s carbon-intensive asset base at a time when global carbon budgets are rapidly shrinking and increase the risk of stranded assets, regulatory non-compliance, and social harm, all of which are foreseeable, thus undermining the credibility of corporate climate strategies that formally endorse the goals of the Paris Agreement and exposing companies to claims of inconsistency or negligence.

In addition, the judgment of the Court of Appeal indirectly clarifies why future climate litigation may increasingly focus on preventing expansion rather than mandating reductions. Courts appear reluctant to dictate exact decarbonisation trajectories, but they may be more receptive to scrutinising whether companies act reasonably when approving new long-term fossil fuel projects in full knowledge of climate science and policy trends. In this sense, the judgment in question does not close the door on climate litigation; it rather redirects it. Claimants may find stronger footing in arguing that new oil and gas investments are incompatible with a company’s acknowledged climate responsibilities and contradict the company’s own climate policies and transition plans.

IV. Conclusions

The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Milieudefensie v. Shell has often been read through the narrow lens of what it did not do: it overturned the first-instance order imposing a specific 45 % emissions-reduction obligation on Shell by 2030. Yet focusing exclusively on this apparent setback risks overlooking more subtle, and arguably more consequential, lessons of the case which may have positive impact for future climate litigation. First, by affirming that climate change poses a real and imminent threat to human rights and that corporations like Shell have a role in addressing it, the Court of Appeal suggests that corporate duties in the climate context remain a legally relevant issue, even if their precise content is contested. The appeal judgment thus preserves the conceptual linkage between human rights, climate harm, and corporate duties, a connection that can be mobilized in other legal contexts, including disclosure obligations and administrative law challenges.

Second, by acknowledging the indirect horizontal effect of human rights, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning consolidates an important doctrinal insight: human rights exert real, if indirect, influence on corporate conduct through private law. Rather than closing the door, the Court of Appeal clarified the conditions under which that influence operates. If the glass appears half empty because courts hesitate to translate global climate goals into concrete obligations for individual corporations, it may also be half full because human rights have firmly entered the legal vocabulary governing corporate responsibility. In the long run, this indirect horizontal effect may prove more influential than the outcome of any single case, reshaping expectations of what responsible corporate behavior in the climate era entails and encouraging litigants to anchor corporate climate obligations in human rights-infused private law standards.

Third, the Court’s observations concerning the relevance of EU climate legislation illustrates how tribunals are moving toward embedding such legislation into the social standard of care. EU directives like the CSDDD and CSRD do not merely inform disclosure or risk management practices, they rather shape the normative baseline against which corporate climate conduct will be judged in courts. As EU legislation matures and enforcement mechanisms crystallize, the “glass” of climate litigation may indeed become more than half full, by transforming regulatory duties into enforceable standards of corporate care. Future claimants, for their part, may increasingly frame their arguments around alleged inconsistencies between corporate conduct and EU climate objectives, focusing on whether companies are adequately implementing, anticipating, or internalizing EU regulatory requirements.

Finally, the considerations developed by the Court of Appeal as regards new investments in fossil fuels strengthen the conceptual link between corporate climate responsibility and strategic business decisions, suggesting that courts are increasingly attentive to whether companies should be expanding fossil fuel production at all. New investments in oil and gas thus emerge as a central fault line in future climate litigation, thus opening the door to a more focused and potentially more effective phase of climate litigation itself that scrutinizes how corporate strategies shape future emissions and climate risks, rather than merely how they account for the past.

To conclude, the appeal judgment in Milieudefensie v. Shell shows that even apparent setbacks can generate legal learning, sharpen strategic thinking, and ultimately contribute to the incremental development of climate accountability.

  1. 1 UN Environment Programme, Climate Change in the courtroom: Trends, impacts, and emerging lessons, 2025, available at: https://www.unep.org/resources/report/global-climate-litigation-report-2025-status-review.

  2. 2 Ibidem, p. 5.

  3. 3 Ibidem.

  4. 4 The first climate case record in the Sabin Center’s Climate Change Litigation Databases is City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which was decided in 1990. 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (United States of America).

  5. 5 According to the Report “Climate Change in the courtroom: Trends, impacts, and emerging lessons”, p. 7, as of 30 June 2025, there are 305 cases in the Global South, 611 in the Global North (or 2,595 cases, including the United States of America); and 216 in international and regional courts, tribunals and adjudicatory bodies (which can include plaintiffs from the Global North and Global South). If considering the cases in the United States of America, cases in the Global North represent 83.2 % of the total number of climate litigation cases. Cases in the Global South amount to 9.8%, while international and regional cases amount to 7.1%.

  6. 6 On climate change litigation, see Helen Keller, Corina Heri (eds.), Reparation for Climate Change: The Successes and Limits of Litigation, sui generis, Zurich, 2026; Maria Antonia Tigre, Melanie Jean Murcott, Susan Ann Samuel (eds.), Climate Litigation and Vulnerabilities Global South Perspectives, Routledge, London, 2025; Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh, Sarah Mead (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook on Climate Litigation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2025; Francesco Sindico, Kate Mckenzie, Gastón Medici-Colombo, Lennart Wegener (eds.), Research Handbook on Climate Change Litigation, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2024; Ivano Alogna, Carole Billiet, Matteo Fermeglia, Alina Holzhausen (eds.), Climate Change Litigation in Europe: Regional, Comparative and Sectoral Perspectives, Larcier-Intersentia, Cambridge, 2023; Riccardo Luporini, Strategic Litigation at the Domestic and International Levels as a Tool to Advance Climate Change Adaptation?, in Yearbook of International Disaster Law, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 2023, pp. 202-236; Francesco Sindico, Makane Moïse Mbengue (eds.), Comparative Climate Change Litigation: Beyond the Usual Suspects, Springer, Cham, 2021; Wolfgang Kahl, Marc-Philippe Weller (eds.), Climate Change Litigation: A Handbook, Beck-Hart-Nomos, Baden Baden-München-Oxford, 2021; Jacqueline Peel, Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation Regulatory Pathways to Cleaner Energy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015.

  7. 7 According to the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia University Database, as of November 2025, there are three cases pending before the International Criminal Court, 3 cases pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union and one case pending before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Additionally, three cases are before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR). Finally, there are two cases pending before African regional courts, including the East African Court of Justice (one case) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) (one case). Particularly interesting is the petition filed with the AfCHPR on 2 May 2025 by the Pan African Lawyers Union seeking an Advisory Opinion on African States’ human rights obligations in the context of climate change: see Muyiwa Adigun, Climate Change Litigation before International Human Rights Tribunals in Africa: The Role of Advisory Opinions, in International Community Law Review, Vol. 27, Issue 1-2, 2025, pp. 136-161; Nouwagnon Olivier Afogo, Maria Antonia Tigre, Armando Rocha, Miriam Cohen, Defining Climate Justice in the African Human Rights System: On the Climate Advisory Opinion Request to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Verfassungsblog, 2 July 2025, https://verfassungsblog.de/climate-advisory-opinion-request-to-the-african-court-on-human-and-peoples-rights/; Yusra Suedi, Africa’s Turn: The African Court’s Advisory Opinion on Climate Change, EJIL: Talk!, 22 May 2025, https://www.ejiltalk.org/africas-turn-the-african-courts-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change/.

  8. 8 ITLOS, Advisory Opinion on the Request Submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law, 27 May 2024. For a comment, see Lisa Benjamin, Cymie Payne, The ITLOS Advisory Opinion on Climate Change and International Law: A Solid Legal Foundation for State Obligations on Climate Change, in Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 39, Issue 1, 2025, pp. 27-36.; Bastiaan E. Klerk, The ITLOS Advisory Opinion on Climate Change: Revisiting the Relationship between the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Paris Agreement, in Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, Vol. 34, Issue 1, 2025, pp. 181-193; Benoit Mayer, Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 119, Issue 1, 2025, pp. 153-160.

  9. 9 IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-32/25 on the Climate Emergency and Human Rights, requested by the Republic of Colombia and the Republic of Chile, 29 May 2025. For an overview, see Lucas Carlos Lima, Climate Change before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in Rivista di diritto internazionale, Vol. 1, 2025, pp. 47-74; Eoin Jackson, Advancing Corporate Climate Accountability Post the Inter-American Court Advisory Opinion on Human Rights and the Climate Emergency, EJIL: Talk!, 21 July 2025, https://www.ejiltalk.org/advancing-corporate-climate-accountability-post-the-inter-american-court-advisory-opinion-on-human-rights-and-the-climate-emergency/; Juan Auz, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion on the Climate Emergency: A Global South Contribution to Climate Governance, EJIL: Talk!, 18 July 2025, https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-inter-american-court-of-human-rights-advisory-opinion-on-the-climate-emergency-a-global-south-contribution-to-climate-governance/.

  10. 10 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change, 23 July 2025. For a comment, see Peter Lawrence, Michael Reder, Representing Future Generations: Climate Change and the Global Legal Order, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2025, pp. 145-177; Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh, The Advisory Proceedings on Climate Change Before the International Court of Justice, in Fabio Amato, Viola Carofalo, Adele del Guercio, Anna Fazzini, Valentina Grado, Emma Imparato, Anna Liguori (eds.), Climate Change, Human Rights and International Migration. Cambiamento climatico, diritti umani e migrazioni internazionali, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2025, pp. 25-30; Tomas Burri, The ICJ’s Opinion on Climate Change: Pushing the Boundaries of International Law, ASIL Insights, 2 October 2025, https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/29/issue/13.

  11. 11 ECtHR, Verein Klimaseniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, App. no. 53600/20, Judgment of 9 April 2024. For a comment, see Annalisa Savaresi, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland: Making Climate Change Litigation History, in Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, Vol. 34, Issue 1, 2025, pp. 279-287; Andreas Hösli, Meret Rehmann, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland: The European Court of Human Rights’ Answer to Climate Change, in Climate Law, Vol. 14, Issue 3-4, 2024, pp. 263-284; Chris Hilson, Oliver Geden, Climate or Carbon Neutrality? Which One Must States Aim for Under Article 8 ECHR?, EJIL: Talk!, 29 April 2024, www.ejiltalk.org/climate-or-carbon-neutrality-which-one-must-states-aim-for-under-article-8-echr/; Jeremy Letwin, Klimaseniorinnen: The Innovative and the Orthodox, EJIL: Talk!, 17 April 2024, www.ejiltalk.org/klimaseniorinnen-the-innovative-and-the-orthodox/; Stephen Humphreys, A Swiss Human Rights Budget?, EJIL: Talk!, 12 April 2024, www.ejiltalk.org/a-swiss-human-rights-budget/; Annalisa Savaresi, Linnéa Nordlander, Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh, Climate Change Litigation before the European Court of Human Rights: A New Dawn, Global Network for Human Rights and the Environment, 12 April 2024, https://gnhre.org/?p=17984; Ole Pedersen, Climate Change and the ECHR: The Results Are In, EJIL: Talk!, 11 April 2024, www.ejiltalk.org/climate-change-and-the-echr-the-results-are-in/; Antoine Buyse, Kushtrim Istrefi, Climate Cases Decided Today: Small Step or Huge Leap?, ECHR Blog, 9 April 2024, www.echrblog.com/2024/04/climate-cases-decided-today-small-step.html; Marko Milanovic, A Quick Take on the European Court’s Climate Change Judgments, EJIL: Talk!, 9 April 2024, www.ejiltalk.org/a-quick-take-on-the-european-courts-climate-change-judgments/.

  12. 12 ECtHR, Carême v. France, App. no. 7189/21, Judgment of 9 April 2024. For a comment, see Marta Torre-Schaub, The European Court of Human Rights’ Kick into Touch: Some Comments under Carême v. France, in Climate Law. A Sabin Centre Blog, 19 April 2024, https://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2024/04/19/the-european-court-of-human-rights-kick-into-touch-some-comments-under-careme-v-france/; Marta Torre-Schaub, The Future of European Climate Change Litigation: The Carême Case before the European Court of Human Rights, Verfassungsblog, 10 October 2022, https://verfassungsblog.de/the-future-of-european-climate-change-litigation/.

  13. 13 ECtHR, Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Other States, App. No. 39371/20, Judgment of 9 April 2024. See Lea Raible, States’ Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Relation to GHG Emissions After Duarte Agostinho v Portugal, in European Convention on Human Rights Law Review, 2025, pp. 1-19; Corina Heri, On the Duarte Agostinho Decision, Verfassungsblog, 15 April 2024, https://verfassungsblog.de/on-the-duarte-agostinho-decision/; Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, Maria-Louiza Deftou, Breaking New Ground: Climate Change before the Strasbourg Court, EJIL: Talk!, 12 April 2024, https://www.ejiltalk.org/breaking-new-ground-climate-change-before-the-strasbourg-court/.

  14. 14 ECtHR, Greenpeace Nordic and Others v. Norway, App. No. 34068/21, Judgment of 28 October 2025. For a comment, see Pranav Ganesan, Leaving Out ‘Leaving it in the Ground’: The ECtHR’s Greenpeace Nordic Judgment, EJIL: Talk! 10 November 2025, https://www.ejiltalk.org/leaving-out-leaving-it-in-the-ground-the-ecthrs-greenpeace-nordic-judgment/.

  15. 15 AfCHPR, Ligue Ivorienne des Droits de L’Homme and Others v. Cote D’Ivoire. App. No. 041/2016, Judgment of 5 September 2023. For a comment, see Elena Carpanelli, Lo smaltimento di rifiuti tossici al vaglio della Corte africana dei diritti umani e dei popoli: la pronuncia nel caso LIDHO e altri c. Costa d’Avorio, in Federalismi.it., Vol. 9, 2025, pp. 48-68; Kofi Arnaud Kpla, L’arrêt Ligue ivoirienne des droits de l’homme (LIDHO) et autres c. Côte d’Ivoire: une mutation complexe du contentieux environnemental Trafigura, in African Human Rights Yearbook / Annuaire Africain des Droits de l’Homme, Vol. 8, 2024, pp. 523-539; Yusra Suedi, Marie Fall, Ligue Ivorienne des Droits de L’Homme and Others v. Cote D’Ivoire. App. No. 041/2016, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 118, Issue 4, 2024, pp. 710-716; Solomon Dersso, Elsabé Boshoff, Extending Human Rights Accountability for Corporate Actors in the LIDHO v Cote d’Ivoire case of the African Court, in EJIL: Talk!, 21 February 2024, https://www.ejiltalk.org/extending-human-rights-accountability-for-corporate-actors-in-the-lidho-v-cote-divoire-case-of-the-african-court/.

  16. 16 On this topic, see André Nollkaemper, Avoid, Align or Contest? An Examination of National Courts’ Postures in International Climate Law Litigation, in Transnational Environmental Law, 2025, pp. 1-31; Elena D’Alessandro, Judicial Remedies for Climate Change in Domestic Courts How Civil Lawsuits Can Sustain Engagement between the Present and Future Generations. Insights from a Civil Law Perspective, in International Journal of Procedural Law, 2024, pp. 3-24; Giorgia Pane, Climate Litigation between International Law and Domestic Remedies: The Virtuous Example of Collective Claims, in Stefano Zirulia, Lidia Sandrini, Cesare Pitea (a cura di), What Future for Environmental and Climate Litigation? Exploring the Added Value of a Multidisciplinary Approach from International, Private and Criminal Law Perspectives, Milano, Milano University Press, 2024, pp. 31-52; Agnes Viktoria Rydberg, Climate Change Litigation: General Perspectives and Emerging Trends, in International Community Law Review, Vol. 26, 2024, pp. 347-366; Jannika Jahn, Domestic Courts as Guarantors of International Climate Cooperation: Insights from the German Constitutional Court’s Climate Decision, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 21, Issue 3, 2023, pp. 859-883; Pau de Vilchez Moragues, Climate in Court: Defining State Obligations on Global Warming Through Domestic Climate Litigation, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2022.

  17. 17 See, among others, Switzerland’s Federal Administrative Court, Uniterre et al. v. Swiss Department of the Environment (Swiss Farmers Case), pending.

  18. 18 See, among others, Court of Appeal of Bruxelles, VZW Klimaatzaak v. Kingdom of Belgium & Others, Judgment of 30 November 2023; Federal Supreme Court of Brazil, PSB et al. v. Brazil (on Amazon Fund), ADO 59/DF, Judgment of 16 August 2023; Federal Supreme Court of Brazil, PSB et al. v. Brazil (on Climate Fund), ADPF 708, Judgment of 1 July 2022; Federal Constitutional Court, Neubauer v. Germany, Judgment of 24 March 2021; Irish Supreme Court, Friends of the Irish Environment (FIE) v. Ireland, Judgment of 31 July 2020; Supreme Court of The Netherlands, Urgenda Foundation v. State of The Netherlands, Case No. C/09/456689 / ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007, Judgment of 20 December 2019.

  19. 19 Brazilian Supreme Court, ADPF 746 (fires in the Pantanal and the Amazon Forest), Judgment of 20 March 2024; Papua New Guinea National Court, Mayur Renewables Ltd v. Mirisim, PGNC 7, N10649, Judgment of 22 January 2024, Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica, Individual v. Government of Costa Rica, pending.

  20. 20 Chile’s Second Environmental Court, Municipality of Cerrillos (Google Data Center) v. Evaluation Commission of the Metropolitan Region, Judgment of 26 February 2024; U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Conservation Law Foundation v. ExxonMobil Corp., Judgment of 5 December 2023; Chile’s Second Environmental Court, State Defense Council vs. Quiborax S.A., pending.

  21. 21 Commercial Court of Tournai, Hugues Falys, FIAN, Greenpeace, Ligue des droits humains v. Total Energies, Judgment of 1 March 2024; Cantonal Court of Zug, Asmania et al. v. Holcim, A1 2023/9, Judgment of 31 January 2023.

  22. 22 Supreme Court of New Zealand, Michael John Smith v. Fonterra Co-op. Grp. Ltd., SC 149/2021 NZSC 5, Judgment of 7 February 2024.

  23. 23 District Court of The Hague, Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, C/09/571932/HA ZA 19-379, Judgment of 26 May 2021. For a comment, see Benoit Mayer, The Duty of Care of Fossil-Fuel Producers for Climate Change Mitigation: Milieudefensie v. Royal Dutch Shell District Court of The Hague (The Netherlands), in Transnational Environmental Law, Vol. 11, Issue 2, 2022, pp. 407-418; A Hösli, Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell: A Tipping Point in Climate Change Litigation against Corporations?, in Climate Law, Vol. 11, Issue 2, 2021, pp. 195-209; Chiara Macchi, Josephine van Zeben, Business and Human Rights Implications of Climate Change Litigation: Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell, in Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, Vol. 30, Issue 3, 2021, pp. 1-7; Phillip Paiement, Reimagining the Energy Corporation: Milieudefensie and Others v Royal Dutch Shell Plc, in Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 2021, pp. 281-299; Otto Spijkers, Friends of the Earth Netherlands (Milieudefensie) v Royal Dutch Shell, in Chinese Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 5, Issue 2, 2021, pp. 237-256.

  24. 24 District Court of The Hague, Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, C/09/571932/HA ZA 19-379, Judgment of 26 May 2021, para. 4.4.1.

  25. 25 Ibidem, para. 4.4.2.

  26. 26 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2024:2100, Judgment of 12 November 2024. For a comment, see Elisa Baroncini, Corporate Climate Litigation: The Shell Appeal Judgment, in New Institutional Architectures and Substantive Rules in International Economic Law, in Elisa Baroncini, Carlo de Stefano, Luca Rubini (eds.), The EU and the UN Sustainable Development Goals, Bologna, Bologna University Press, 2025, pp. 169-188; Bengt Johannsen, Louis J. Kotzé, Chiara Macchi, An Empty Victory? Shell v. Milieudefensie et al 2024, The Legal Obligations of Carbon Majors, and The Prospects for Future Climate Litigation Action, in Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, Vol. 34, Issue 1, 2025, pp. 270-278; Carlo Vittorio Giabardo, Corporate Climate Responsibility After “Milieudefensie vs. Shell” Court of Appeal Decision, EJIL: Talk!, 17 December 2024, https://www.ejiltalk.org/corporate-climate-responsibility-after-milieudefensie-vs-shell-court-of-appeal-decision/; Jolene Lin, Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell: Analysis and Commentary of the Hague Court of Appeal’s Decision, Centre for International Law of the National University of Singapore Blog, 18 November 2024, https://cil.nus.edu.sg/blogs/milieudefensie-et-al-v-shell-analysis-and-commentary-of-the-hague-court-of-appeals-decision/.

  27. 27 Shell Plc, Shell Welcomes Dutch Court of Appeal Ruling, 12 November 2024, https://www.shell.com/news-and-insights/newsroom/news-and-media-releases/2024/shellwelcomes-dutch-court-of-appeal-ruling.html.

  28. 28 Supreme Court of The Netherlands, Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, filed on 11 February 2025, pending.

  29. 29 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, para. 7.17.

  30. 30 Ibidem, para. 7.24. Art. 6:612 of the Dutch Civil Code states that “whoever commits an unlawful act against another, that can be attributed to him, is obliged to compensate for the damage suffered by the other as a result”. The term “unlawful act” has long been interpreted as including a so-called “societal duty of care” requiring people not to act contrary to “unwritten rules of (un)acceptable societal behavior.” This duty is a so-called “open norm” which must be interpreted on a case-by-case basis, in light of the situation at hand, and with reference to available “objective reference points.” The latter include relevant legal principles, constitutional rights, jurisprudence and expert reports.

  31. 31 Ibidem, para 7.25.

  32. 32 UNHRC, United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UN Doc. HR/PUB/11/04, 16 June 2011.

  33. 33 OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, 8 June 2023.

  34. 34 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, para 7.27.

  35. 35 Ibidem, para. 7.24.

  36. 36 Ibidem, paras. 7.79 and 7.81.

  37. 37 Ibidem, para. 7.27.

  38. 38 Ibidem, para. 3.5.

  39. 39 Ibidem, para. 7.65.

  40. 40 Ibidem, para. 7.64.

  41. 41 Ibidem, para. 7.65.

  42. 42 Ibidem, para. 3.24.

  43. 43 Ibidem, para. 7.67.

  44. 44 Ibidem, para. 7.99.

  45. 45 Ibidem.

  46. 46 Ibidem, para. 7.73.

  47. 47 Ibidem, para. 7.75.

  48. 48 Ibidem, para. 7.81.

  49. 49 Ibidem, para. 7.91.

  50. 50 Ibidem, para. 7.92.

  51. 51 Ibidem, para. 7.95.

  52. 52 Ibidem, para. 7.106.

  53. 53 Ibidem.

  54. 54 Ibidem.

  55. 55 Clientearth, Dutch Shell ruling disappointing but legal responsibilities for high-emitting companies still firmly in the spotlight, 12 November 2024, https://www.clientearth.org/latest/press-office/press-releases/dutch-shell-ruling-disappointing-but-legal-responsibilities-for-high-emitting-companies-still-firmly-in-the-spotlight/; Centre for International Environmental Law, Appeal Ruling Grants Shell Temporary Reprieve but Reaffirms Obligation to Limit Carbon Emissions, 12 November 2024, https://www.ciel.org/news/appeal-ruling-grants-shell-temporary-reprieve-but-reaffirms-obligation-to-limit-carbon-emissions/.

  56. 56 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, para. 7.18.

  57. 57 Ibidem.

  58. 58 Ibidem.

  59. 59 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, para. 7.24.

  60. 60 Ibidem, para. 7.25.

  61. 61 Ibidem, para. 7.26.

  62. 62 Ibidem, para. 7.27.

  63. 63 Ibidem, para. 7.26.

  64. 64 Ibidem, para. 7.27.

  65. 65 In this sense, see also Maria Antonia Tigre, Marlies Hesselman, Milieudefensie v Shell: 3 Takeaways and Challenges on the Appeal’s Court Decision, Climate Law Blog, 12 December 2024, https://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2024/12/12/milieudefensie-v-shell-3-takeaways-and-challenges-on-the-appeals-court-decision/ 1/5; Lucia Jeremiašová, The Court of Appeal Judgment in Shell v. Milieudefensie: As One Door Closes, Another Opens, Blogging for Sustainability, University of Oslo, 18 November 2024, https://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/areas/sustainabilitylaw/blog/2024/shell-v-milieudefensie.html; Cris Hilson, Into Reverse Gear: Shell v Milieudefensie and The Non-Regression Principle, Verfassungsblog, 15 November 2024, https://verfassungsblog.de/shell-milieudefensie-non-retrogression/; Phillip Paiement, Towards A Bundle Of Duties: Shell v Milieudefensie Conforms Major Developments in Climate Change Liability, Verfassungsblog, 15 November 2024, https://verfassungsblog.de/shell-milieudefensie-climate-obligations; André Nollkaemper, Lessons of A Landmark Lost: Judgment of The Hague Court of Appeal in Shell v Milieudefensie, Verfassungsblog, 12 November 2024, https://verfassungsblog.de/shellmilieudefensie- climate-litigation/.

  66. 66 On this see, among others, Gunther Teubner, Transnational Fundamental Rights: Horizontal Effect?, in Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Vol. 40, Issue 3, 2011, pp. 191-215; Olivier De Schutter (ed.), Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, Oxford, Hart, 2006; Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation, Oxford, Hart, 2004; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere, Oxford, Clarendon, 1993.

  67. 67 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, paras. 7.1-7.5.

  68. 68 Regulation (EU) 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism, OJEU L 130/52, 16 May 2023.

  69. 69 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, para. 7.48. The Court refers, in particular, to the EU Regulation on sustainable aviation fuels (ReFuelEU), the EU Regulation on cleaner shipping fuels (FuelEU), the EU Regulation on stricter CO2 performance standards for cars and vans, and the EU Directive promoting the use of energy from renewable resources.

  70. 70 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, para. 7.28.

  71. 71 Directive (EU) 2022/2464 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU) 537/2014, Directive 2004/109/EC, Directive 2006/43/EC and Directive 2013/34/EU, as regards corporate sustainability reporting OJEU L322/15, 16 December 2022.

  72. 72 Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859, OJEC L, 2024/1760, 5 July 2024. On the Directive, see among others Morgane Thorens, Nadia Bernaz, Otto Hospes, Advocating for the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive Against the Odds: Strategies and Legitimation, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 63, Issue 2, 2025, pp. 606-623; Angelica Bonfanti, Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive: A Human Rights-Based Assessment, in Rivista del commercio internazionale, Vol. 4, 2024, pp. 857-893; Nicolas Bueno, Nadia Bernaz, Gabrielle Holly, Olga Martin-Ortega, The EU Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence (CSDDD): The Final Political Compromise, in Business and Human Rights Journal, Vol. 9, 2024, pp. 294-300; Chantal Mak, Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence: More Than Ticking the Boxes?, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 29, Issue 3, 2022, pp. 301-303.

  73. 73 Art. 29 a, para. 2, let. a), point iii), Consolidated sustainability reporting, of the EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive.

  74. 74 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, para. 7.52.

  75. 75 Ibidem, para. 7.53.

  76. 76 Ibidem.

  77. 77 On 26 February 2025, the EU Commission published two Omnibus packages. On 3 April 2025 and 16 April 2025, the EU legislators endorsed, via a fast-track procedure, the first Omnibus “stop the clock” proposal to postpone some reporting deadlines under the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. With the formal adoption of the First Omnibus “stop the clock” proposal, the entry into application of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive requirements for large undertakings that have not yet started reporting is postponed by two years, and the transposition deadline and first phase of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive is postponed by one year. The second Omnibus aims to reduce the burden of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive by at least 25 %. This includes simplifying sustainable finance reporting and due diligence requirements to support the European Green Deal’s goals. On 16 December 2025, the European Parliament approved the first Omnibus package. On the fractious negotiations to reach a final Omnibus I proposal, see Angelica Bonfanti, EU Corporate Sustainability at a Crossroads: The Omnibus Proposal to Amend the EU Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and Its Ongoing Negotiation, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, Vol.19, Issue 2, 2025, pp. 532-541.

  78. 78 In this sense see also André Nollkaemper, Lessons of A Landmark Lost: Judgment of The Hague Court of Appeal in Shell v Milieudefensie, Verfassungsblog, 12 November 2024, https://verfassungsblog.de/shellmilieudefensie- climate-litigation/.

  79. 79 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, para. 7.46.

  80. 80 Ibidem, para. 3.51.

  81. 81 Ibidem, para 7.58-7.62.

  82. 82 In this sense, see Greg Muttitt, No New Fossil Fuel Projects: The Logical First Step In A Transition To Clean Energy, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 11 June 2024, https://www.iisd.org/articles/insight/no-new-fossil-fuel-projects-logical-first-step-transition-clean-energy.

  83. 83 Court of Appeal of The Hague, Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell PLC, para. 7.58.

  84. 84 Ibidem, para. 7.61.

  85. 85 Ibidem, para. 7.62.